Interview with political scientists Nader Hashemi and Danny Postel
The West's "intellectually lazy" obsession with sectarianism

Danny Postel and Nader Hashemi warn in this interview with Emran Feroz against the tendency in Western media and policy circles to view Middle Eastern politics in essentialist sectarian terms. "Sectarianization: Mapping the New Politics of the Middle East", their recent collection of essays, examines the topic in depth

Can you explain briefly what you mean by the term "sectarianisation" when talking about politics in the Middle East?

Danny Postel: There has been a dramatic spike in sectarian conflict and violence in the Middle East in recent years – in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Bahrain, Kuwait and in public opinion across the region. Saudi-Iranian rivalry is central to this development: these two regional powers use and exacerbate sectarian enmity, looming large in what we might call the sectarian imaginary. Anti-Shia and anti-Iranian sentiment is at an all-time high in the Middle East and beyond, even in societies with no Shia populations, like Malaysia. IS, which is anti-Shia to the core, is both a symptom and a driver of this explosion in sectarian animosity.

As recently as 2006, two of the most popular figures in the Arab world were Hassan Nasrallah and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad – two Shia Muslims, one of them non-Arab. Today, several years into Syriaʹs civil war, Hezbollah and the Islamic Republic of Iran are deeply unpopular among Sunni Arabs. What changed?

Nader Hashemi: Sectarian fault lines have hardened and come to dominate the politics of the Middle East through a process. We call this process sectarianisation. It didnʹt just "happen": it was set in motion by political actors pursuing political goals that involve popular mobilisation, including the mobilisation of emotions, around religious identity markers.

It is the "cultivation of hatred", to borrow a phrase from the late historian Peter Gay. The sectarianisation process is multi-layered, operating top-down (state generated); bottom-up (socially generated); outside-in (fuelled by regional forces); and inside-out (the spread of conflicts from inside national borders into neighbouring states).

Cover of "Sectarianization: Mapping the New Politics of the Middle East", edited by Danny Postel and Nader Hashemi (published by Oxford University Press)
The "cultivation of hatred": sectarian fault lines have hardened and come to dominate the politics of the Middle East through a process – sectarianisation – set in motion by political actors pursuing political goals that involve popular mobilisation around religious identity markers

Many people try to explain political conflicts in the Middle East or in the Muslim-dominated parts of the world by talking about the "deep conflict" between Shias and Sunnis that started in the early days of Islam. Why is this wrong and why are current sectarian problems not connected with these ancient blood feuds?

Postel: In recent years, a narrative has taken hold in Western policy and media circles that attributes the turmoil and violence engulfing the Middle East to supposedly ancient sectarian hatreds. "Sectarianism" has become a catch-all explanation for virtually all of the regionʹs problems.

This narrative can be found across the political spectrum – from right-wing voices with openly anti-Muslim agendas, to softer liberal-centrist articulations and even certain commentators on the left. In its various forms, this sectarian essentialism has become a new conventional wisdom in the West. It is an intellectually lazy, ideologically convenient and deeply Orientalist narrative.

Itʹs so much easier for politicians, pundits and diplomats to rely on the "ancient hatreds" claim: if Sunni and Shia Muslims have hated one another for centuries, this "explains" why the region is plagued by conflict and also lets the West off the hook. It conveniently elides the role of Western policies in the present state of the region.

The U.S. invasion of Iraq; the support of various Western governments for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which commits war crime upon war crime in Yemen and disseminates poisonous sectarian propaganda throughout the Sunni world; not to mention longstanding Western support for highly repressive dictators who manipulate sectarian fears and anxieties as a strategy of control and regime survival – the "ancient hatreds" narrative washes this all away and lays the blame for the regionʹs problems on supposedly trans-historical religious passions. Itʹs absurd in the extreme and an exercise in bad faith.

How far are Orientalist views and the problematic use of the term "sectarianism" present in current debates? Do we see it just on the far-right or also in left-wing circles?

Postel: Versions of the sectarian narrative can be found on the right, in the centre and on the left. The New York Times columnist and establishment sage Thomas Friedman, for instance, claims that in Yemen today "the main issue is the seventh century struggle over who is the rightful heir to the Prophet Muhammad – Shias or Sunnis."

Barack Obama asserted that the issues plaguing the Middle East today are "rooted in conflicts that date back millennia." A more vulgar version of this view prevails among right-wing commentators. The former cable television host Bill OʹReilly has remarked that "the Sunni and Shia want to kill each other. They want to blow each other up. They want to torture each other. They have fun. … This is what Allah tells them to do and thatʹs what they do."

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Comments for this article: The West's "intellectually lazy" obsession with sectarianism

Good! Thanks. Class should be added. There is an overlapping between sect and class in some Arab countries, namely Lebanon, Syria and Iraq. In the example of Syria we have seen how the Syrian businessmen and bourgoisie in genral in Aleppo and Damascus did not effectively oppose the regime. They either supported and financed it or stood passive. Only a minority fled the country.

Nadeem20.10.2018 | 11:08 Uhr