Why do Arabs fight tribal wars and not civil wars? Or to put it another way, why have modern civil identities not succeeded in overcoming Arab tribal identities? The adoption of civil identities doesnʹt exclude the possibility of war and the twentieth century has seen many of these. But the dilemma facing identities based on kinship is that its civil wars go on and on.
Civil identity and the liberal era
From the end of the 19th century to the 1940s, the Arab liberal era saw the development and growth of civil identities. Two factors may have led to this: firstly, economic development and independence through the emergence of modern industry, which allowed other aspects to develop, including class identity. The struggles which arose in the economic sphere crystallised along class lines and they transcended civil identities. Labourers toiled in unfair conditions and they identified themselves as workers in the fight against capitalist exploitation, regardless of their sectarian affiliations.
Secondly, the parliamentary system, the free press and the emerging middle class combined to create a public space which adopted a common language and this transcended communities and social groups.This doesnʹt mean that the social group was absent; on the contrary, it was there and we can see this if we look closely and see how deeply rooted it was in many Arab parties and political movements of that time. Notwithstanding this, economic independence and the existence of a public space gave rise to areas which were relatively free from kith and kin. Thus, the social group had to develop an outlook and a language which would not cut it off from the others.
The contradictions of the liberal era, such as economic incongruities, the manipulation of the parliamentary system and government administrations that benefitted the elite, were the reasons for its demise and its subsequent dismantling by populist authoritarian regimes. They came to power by means of coups, which were mostly predicated upon partisan ties. Even with traditionalist regimes, their legitimacy was built upon long-established partisanship that protects the system.
Dismantling of the public domain
From the second half of the 20th century onwards, the Arab state expanded and took control of society through nationalisation, as was the case with the populist regimes or through monopolisation of the sources of wealth in other countries. In so doing, it took command of the economy and annihilated the public sphere. Everything became hostage to national security. The state became the executor of power, wealth and social status, although control over the state itself was possible only through partisan ties and kinship.
By dismantling the public domain, such as the free press and the parliamentary system, the state destroyed the space in which civil and national identities might have been nurtured and developed beyond the purview of the social group. This latter comprises the daily life of the neighbourhood, the clubs and the networks of friends and it encompasses the contacts and circles which underpin business, which are in turn based on family and sectarian affiliations.
As opposed to the daily purview of the social group, modern identity seems to be more abstract, less tangible and less routine. It calls for a "collective" or people who are not directly part of everyday relationships. The "nation" is an example of this, with its call for an imaginary collective that transcends our daily relationships. As Benedict Anderson argues, it is only present when it can develop across a broad swathe of the public domain.
This is true from a class perspective, although it can only be seen properly in the context of the class struggle itself. Moreover, class identity can only have a role when it is supported by the logic of economic independence, unless it is replaced by a state system that can raise revenue in order to re-distribute wealth, transforming itself by providing welfare and buying allegiance.
With its monopolisation of the economy, the Arab state has become the route to wealth. Indeed, wealth can only be acquired through dealings with the state in order to obtain contracts or import and export licences, or even to secure a government position that allows the job holder the opportunity for bribery, or at the very least, which gives him a position and a livelihood. This type of interaction has reinforced the relationships of kinship represented by the networks of clientele among government personnel and their circles.
The Arab state, whether it is revenue-generating or populist, has never been a modern state in the normal sense of a civil society trying to build a nation. On the contrary, it remains focussed on garnering wealth for the dominant social group, thereby protecting kith and kin.
© Qantara.de 2018
Translated from the Arabic by Chris Somes-Charlton