In a well-functioning democracy, an early election would have been called in September 2018, when the governing coalition felt apart and perhaps as early as 2016, when Nidaa Tounes lost its majority in parliament. But most Tunisian political parties suffer too much dissension or are too weak to run. And the current ructions are even jeopardising the work of the Independent High Authority for Elections.
There is now a real risk that the 2019 elections will be postponed. For a fragile democracy led by a nonagenarian, saddled by an endless state of emergency and lacking a constitutional court, this delay may prove fatal.
From a state-centred economy to an IMF transition economy
Tunisiaʹs political crisis is occurring alongside an economic one. As Tunisia has moved from a controlled economy under dictatorship to a transitional one marked by austerity measures and structural reforms dictated by the International Monetary Fund, corruption has spread and investors have fled. Today, with public debt, unemployment and inflation growing, strikes and protests are increasingly common and support for democracy – frequently portrayed as the cause of the current tumult – has dwindled.
Ennahda, an economically liberal party that draws important support from informal economic circles and outside the public sector, backed the IMFʹs economic reforms; the Tunisian General Labour Union (UGTT), which represents public-sector workers, did not. Leftists and many remnants of the former regime were also opposed. Chahed, meanwhile, was aggressive in implementing the IMF-backed reforms, in part to win support from abroad. But his approach put the UGTT, alongside old-guard politicians and some key socioeconomic groups, on the same side as Essebsi. In fact, the UGTT led the mediations during the crisis of 2013.
Foreign influence is another destabilising factor. Today, Tunisia is a geopolitical battlefield for regional powers like Egypt, Turkey and the Gulf states and Tunisian politicians occasionally take sides to suit their suitorsʹ goals. Broadly speaking, Saudi Arabia and the UAE demonise Tunisiaʹs democracy and Ennahda, while Qatar and Turkey laud both. Both camps have their clients in the country. These players amplify coup rumours and delegitimise Tunisiaʹs political independence, which adds to the publicʹs distrust of the government. Back in 2013, the US, Europe and Algeria limited the reach of these countries. Ironically, in 2018, it is the US, the EU and Algeria that are rattled by internal divisions and terrified of foreign interference.
History holds many lessons for those navigating Tunisiaʹs tumult, with some particularly apt parallels to be found in Russiaʹs post-Soviet transition. There, during his final years in power, a weakened Boris Yeltsin sought to secure his presidential legacy and save his family from prosecution. Hence, the so-called "father of Russian democracy" appointed then-Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, a former KGB officer, to succeed him. Russiaʹs democracy never recovered.
Tunisiaʹs in-fighting and nepotistic policies have a similar feel. The Arab worldʹs most promising democratic experiment can still avert a political meltdown, but it needs help. Local and international mediators guided Tunisia from turmoil once before. They must do so again.
© Project Syndicate 2019
Youssef Cherif is a Tunis-based political analyst, member of the Carnegie Civic Research Network and head of Columbia Global Centers Tunis.