Most Muslim organisations currently seem rather overwhelmed by the situation. Yet how can Muslims and their organisations act in such a situation to send the right signals to the society in Europe where they live?

Roy: There is a clear problem of leadership and representation in the Muslim population – and not just in Europe. On the one hand, this crisis has social roots: the bulk of Muslims living in Europe came as unskilled workers, without their elites. Of course some of the second generation have succeeded at school, but few of them want a career as a religious cleric: the job is neither well paid, nor respected. Interestingly, Muslims in Europe have the same problem as the Catholic Church: a lack of those who feel called to become an imam and the recruitment of "migrant" clerics from the south. The main difference is that the Catholic parish priests coming from Africa have been well trained in seminaries by the Church, while most religious schools in Muslim countries are either Salafist in persuasion, or allow little room for the study of Western cultures and religions.

There are certainly "Muslim" intellectuals in the West: but, as we have seen, most of them are in fact totally secular, if not atheist, and they by definition have little influence on believers: they find their audience among the non-Muslims.

You are an expert on terror organisations like al-Qaida and IS. Are the attacks by IS in Europe a new strategy? How does IS differ from the jihadist groups of the 1980s?

Roy: Al-Qaida and IS have always sought to perpetrate attacks in the West. You canʹt just blame such incidents on specific Western military operations in the Middle East: 9/11 took place before the U.S. operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, not after. It took some time for IS to replace al-Qaida as the operator of terrorist actions in the West, because IS first needed to wait for the western-based volunteers to shift their loyalties from al-Qaida to IS; it worked because IS has been much better at constructing a narrative that attracts young people. The main difference between now and the 1980s is that the terrorists in the eighties always had a plan to escape after putting a bomb somewhere. They were not suicide attacks, whatever the ideological motivations (extreme left, extreme right, pro-Palestinian or Islamist). Since 1995, terrorism has acquired two new aspects: the sociology of the perpetrators (young second generation of born-again Muslims, plus converts) and the centrality of death (either they die in action, or they are killed by the police). There is never a plan B. From this I conclude that there is a link between the profile of the terrorists and their fascination for death.

European governments are currently investing heavily in de-radicalisation projects. Do such projects really reach those young people in Europe who are keen to join IS?

Roy: Hardly. So far, all these initiatives are based on the premise that the radicals donʹt know what they are doing, supposedly because they are under influence (especially young female white converts), or because they have psychological or mental problems, or because they misread the Koran. Hence the idea that therapeutic and religious teaching will help bring them back to the straight and narrow. Yet this is nonsense. They are not crazy (even if they all demonstrate narcissism and a sense of having been wronged), nor did they study Islam first, to decide in favour of radicalism as a result of their religious training. They go for radicalism, because theyʹre attracted to radicalism. Nobody thought to send professors of liberal economics to the jailed Baader Meinhof group in order to explain to them that they had misread Das Kapital! Why do that for Muslims? The only historical precedence of "healing" deviant people is the Catholic Inquisition and the Chinese Communist revolution. Hardly good role models for Western democracies.

In classical Islamic law, jihad is strictly regulated. Only an authority could declare jihad and had rules. But today we have a ʹprivateʹ jihad without any rules. Is modern ʹjihadʹ a result of the crisis of traditional Islam?

Roy: Yes of course. The traditional authorities no longer have any authority; under strict authoritarian state control, they have been emasculated, becoming "state clerics". There is no theological debate, because the states, even when they are supposed to be "secular", cannot accept open discussion. On the other hand, the born-again and the converts construct their own makeshift religion by selecting slogans and ideas on the Internet or from the mouth of self-proclaimed imams. The new contemporary concept of jihad was born during the Soviet-Afghan war and was then conceptualised as being individual, global and permanent by Abdullah Azzam, in opposition to the classical definition (collective, local and limited to a specific time period). The suicide dimension was subsequently added by Osama Bin Laden.

IS in Syria and Iraq is under pressure. They have lost the main regions. Is IS defeated? And what path will the jihadists take after IS?

Roy: Although the defeat of IS is certain, it will not solve the political crisis in the Syria/Iraq region, on the contrary. The grievances of the Sunni Arabs (excluded from the political establishment in both countries) have yet to be answered and they may well find another flag to express it. In all likelihood this will be Tahrir al Sham, the local branch of al-Qaida under the name of al-Nusra and is fighting against the regime in the west of Syria. Once IS is defeated, the Kurds, deprived of U.S. support, will confront both the Turks and the Syrians. Iran will play the role of the regional referee, leading to new tensions between Israel and Hezbollah. So the defeat of IS will lead to a different kind of local war. In the longer term, we will probably see less terrorism in the West, because the local actors will once more have a local agenda.

The issue for the West is what will happen inside the reservoir of radicals in the west – once again, not only Muslims but also converts – after a probably apocalyptic end to the Caliphate. The root causes of this kind of nihilistic revolt are still there; even if experts disagree on where radicalisation comes from, radicalisation still exists. So the real issue is how rebels without a cause could connect with a new global jihadist organisation. A lot depends on how the jihadist groups – primarily Tahrir al Sham – will rethink their strategy to globalise the jihad, because clearly, the idea that global terrorism would bring the West to its knees and leave the field wide open for jihad in the Middle East has failed. But even if Tahrir al Sham rejects global terrorism, there are dozens of local jihadist groups in the world, from Nigeria to Pakistan and Philippines, that could reclaim the legacy of IS and attract volunteers for death. Nor is al-Qaida dead!

Interview conducted by Erin Guvercin

© 2018

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Comments for this article: They love death as we love life: jihad and the roots of terror

"The root causes are still there". I don't think Roy here has elaborated on theese root causes.
"Radicalism" seems does not apply to the "Western" states. There are a few features (political, economic and cultural) which characterise some Western states as "radicals". . I wonder what does Roy think of the structural violence of the state (see Karen Armstrong, for example).
I am a "radicalised" person, but not for the reasons Roy thinks. Was it just that one day, I got up and wanted radicalism as Roy says? That's nonsense.

Nadeem24.07.2018 | 10:38 Uhr

The title is outrageous and smells badly.

Nadeem24.07.2018 | 10:44 Uhr

The phrase "such instances do not exist" does not mean what it is intended to mean. This interview was supposedly conducted in English, but I don't believe it, because the phrase is a literal translation of the German "solche Instanzen gibt es nicht." The correct translation of "solche Instanzen gibt es nicht" is "no such body/authority exists". Please correct this error because no English speaker will ever guess its intended meaning. No Frenchman would make such a mistake when speaking English, either. On the whole I am mystified by this lapse.

[Error duly corrected. Many thanks for flagging it up. Ed.]

Zenobia van Dongen07.09.2018 | 07:05 Uhr