These examples highlight the steady growth of bilateral co-operation. But more profoundly, decision makers in Abu Dhabi and Delhi share common views on their security priorities. Under the leadership of Mohammed bin Zayed, Abu Dhabi sees Islamist movements – and in particular the Muslim Brotherhood – as its biggest threat, arguably more so than Iranian regional ambitions. This resonates directly with the views of Modi and of the architect of his foreign policy, Ajit Doval.
A former intelligence operative, Doval has been Modi’s national security advisor since 2014. In this capacity, he has been leading a more assertive campaign against Islamist militancies targeting India, involving retaliatory strikes deep inside Pakistan. It is, therefore, no surprise that the UAE has continuously supported Indian policies, from the 2016 airstrikes across the Line of Control with Pakistan following the Uri attacks to the abrogation of Kashmir’s special constitutional status.
China's Belt and Road Initiative
Indian-Gulf ties have consequences for the Gulf-Asian nexus, starting with Pakistan. Pakistan was historically the closest Asian partner of GCC countries, thanks to a large Pakistani labour force in the peninsula, the cultivation of a common religious identity, and the significant role Pakistani armed forces played in the building of Gulf militaries. However, Islamabad’s refusal to join the Saudi-led coalition in the Yemen war in 2015 tainted Pakistani-Gulf co-operation.
Yet, this was not translated into a full re-alignment of Gulf countries in South Asia. Although it opened a window of opportunity for enhanced cooperation with India – a momentum that Indian Prime Minister Modi used effectively – the rift was not complete. The election of Imran Khan in 2018 as Pakistan’s Prime Minister led to a new start. Khan looked to the rulers in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi as much needed investors to help keep the economy afloat with a looming IMF bailout.
Ultimately the real challenge to India-Gulf relations will not come from Pakistan, but from China. The GCC-India rapprochement coincided with China’s burgeoning ties in the Arabian Peninsula. Yet, China’s logic is different: Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is the main driver of the new Gulf-China relationship.
India, on the other hand, opposed the BRI, while Saudi Arabia and the UAE, are eager to position themselves as pivotal actors for China in the region. So far, the Gulf countries have been able to cultivate ties with both sides. But if the India-China regional competition escalates and turns into a zero-sum game, this will become a litmus test: third parties like Saudi Arabia or the UAE may be confronted with an inextricable dilemma.
Jean-Loup Samaan
© sada | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2019
Jean-Loup Samaan is Associate Professor in Strategic Studies attached to the UAE National Defence College.
