In Egypt, a third of the population has to live on € 1.50 a day. In Lebanon, a third of the population is below the poverty line. In addition to this, corruption is rife. Transparency International ranks Sudan as the sixth most corrupt nation in the world, seven places ahead of Iraq and with Lebanon not far behind.
The other recurring reason for the discontent can be seen in the non-functioning state services – whether in regard to the sporadic power supplies in the extreme heat of the Iraqi summer, the refuse crisis or the inadequate digital infrastructure in Lebanon, which is comparable with that of a third world nation in a country that presents a gleaming facade to the rest of the world.
Rejection of confessional and political trench warfare
The youth unemployment rate in Iraq is 20 percent. This is particularly dramatic because 60 percent of the population is under 24. The numbers are similar in other Arab nations, where predominantly young people are taking to the streets because they feel they have no future perspectives. The distinctive feature of these protest movements is their spontaneous character and – perhaps with the exception of Sudan – the lack of any organisational structure. Besides, many demonstrators refuse to be politically absorbed by the traditional parties of their nations.
It is also interesting that the protest is not only directed at the Arab autocrats, but – in the case of Lebanon and Iraq – against orders in which confessional groupings and parties dominate the political landscape. For decades, people there have been told that their religious identity is a decisive factor in politics – whether that identity be that of Sunnis, Shias or Christians.
But now, people are realising that these very same religion-based political parties are lining their pockets, creating a confessional buddy economy where ministries are owned by confessional parties and have become self-services stores for these.
Now, people in these very same nations are uniting to demonstrate for a functioning state, for political accountability for those in government and against either own confessional leadership. Economic and social needs are of utmost importance in the discourse on religious identities.
Repression: the rulers' knee-jerk response
The responses from Arab states only serve to highlight their weaknesses. They resort to repression. In Iraq, the very same Shia militias denounced for mismanagement by protesters in the Shia areas of the country fired on demonstrators.
In Egypt, the regime is in a such a panic over any kind of dissent that a few weeks ago, the police began stopping large numbers of people on the streets and demanding access to their phones. Anyone found with anti-government material on their phones is taken away for questioning, as well as anyone refusing to unlock their devices.
Egyptian human rights organisations are reporting more than 4,000 cases of these "mobile phone arrests". The Arab regimes face a fundamental problem here. Repression works, but it also has an expiry date, especially if economic and social problems remain unresolved.
Regardless of whether in the case of Lebanon, Iraq, Algeria, Sudan or Egypt, the same thing always applies: the regimes, the confessional parties and their security apparatuses are no longer the ones deciding what people think and also express. First and foremost through social media, the critical political debate has for a long time now taken on a life of its own, migrating straight from the Internet to the coffeehouse.
And if the genie is now out of the bottle, no autocrat, no military and no confessional party will be able to cram it back in. Then, the process of upheaval will run its course – regardless of the season.
© Qantara.de 2019
Translated from the German by Nina Coon