Perceived Threat Fosters Islamicisation Trend
A new study conducted by the German Institute for Middle East Studies noted an increasing return to religious-cultural values in the Islamic world after 9/11 as a defensive reaction to the politics of the West. Sigrid Faath outlines some of the study's key findings
A study completed in late February 2004 at the Hamburg-based German Institute for Middle East Studies as part of the special research programme menavision 2010 attempted to find out what effects not only domestic political factors, but also developments in the region that have been linked to the USA since 11 September 2001, are having on the population’s threat perception and, consequently, on its need for protection against this identity-related threat.
The purpose of the study was to investigate whether this threat perception is resulting in a revival of "old" identity-shaping factors and therefore an increase in the significance of those that represent such factors, or whether new ideas for dealing with these threats are coming to the fore and new players are gaining in social significance.
The search for identity and the politicisation of religion
Since the second Gulf War in 1990/1 - and even more so since 11 September 2001 and the USA’s more offensive foreign policy in the Middle East - much time and attention has been devoted to discussing the identity of the people in the Islamic world and deliberating on the disassociation of the region from "the West", its attempts at domination, and its influence on the fields of politics, economics, and culture. More so than anywhere else, these discussions have found expression in the debates in Egypt and the states of the Near East.
As a result of the USA’s foreign policy in the Near East and the pressure to implement "Western concepts" exerted by the US government, advocates of Western-style democratisation and modernisation are currently finding it more difficult than ever to promote their ideas and encourage a constructive debate about them.
Defending national sovereignty and/or the region’s own authentic ideas, and the safeguarding of religious and cultural identity are currently the focus of debates.
As the study demonstrates, the politicisation of religion by both the Islamist movement and governments in the region has not stopped. Nor have the states themselves taken any steps to adopt a position of neutrality towards religious communities.
On the contrary: the majority of the Islamist movement - the Wahabite and Egyptian religious Azhar scholars - argue vehemently against the two "Western concepts" of secularisation and democratisation.
No demand for democratic reform
The religiously legitimised states in the region (Saudi Arabia, Morocco), and the Republics in North Africa and the Near and Middle East, whose control of the religious sector has intensified as the Islamist-oriented opposition competing for power in the state has grown in strength, reject the secularisation debate for reasons of legitimation and power-retention.
The neutrality of the state towards religious communities, and therefore the replacement of religion as the leitmotif in all spheres of life and activity by independent rationality, is taboo. The aim is to retain the state’s capacity to control the religious sphere; the state only questions Islamists when it is denied this control. It is not, therefore, the principle of religious neutrality that it rejects.
This attitude affects the political reform debate, which for the most part ignores secularisation and democratisation (in the Western sense). Islamists generally equate secularism with areligiousness, which makes it easier for them to argue that secularism must be rejected and fought.
The consequences for the human rights debate and, more particularly, religious freedom are evident: as Heiner Bielefeldt illustrated in his publication Muslims in The Secular State Governed by The Rule of Law, the issue of religious freedom with regard to Muslims and non-Islamic religious communities in mainly Islamic states is excluded from this debate, and the oft-cited tolerance of Islam towards people who hold other beliefs does not mean religious freedom.
There is no indication that there will be an open debate about this problem in the near future. The influence of Muslim intellectuals who are working for a reform (modernisation) of the interpretation of Islam is still marginal.
Consequently, the religious conservatism that dominates large sections of the population and the influence of the Islamist movement can be felt in all political and social debates in most states in the region.
The "Islamic" way as the solution
Representatives of a conservative religious persuasion, who generally belong to the official (state) religious establishment, and representatives of an Islamist persuasion actually support each other mutually: when it comes to moral issues or their opinions on "the West", many of their positions overlap and cannot be differentiated from one another.
Both try to promote an "Islamic" way to reform, the implementation of human and women’s rights, globalisation, and the preservation of identity.
While the terminology used is modern, the concepts are, however, devoid of their "Western" contents and have been "islamicised" in the spirit of a fundamental interpretation of Islam.
The fact that in recent times, some Islamists have been adapting the way they convey their message to suit the Zeitgeist, new communication methods, the younger generation’s new patterns of consumption and dress, and each social class - as is the case with the popular Egyptian Islamist television preacher Amr Khaled - should not be allowed to blind anyone to the fact that the messages disseminated in this way have nothing whatsoever to do with a modern, reformed Islam.
A world divided into two camps
The image of the world (philosophy) they promote is, in fact, based on a division of the world into two parts and is intended to promote mechanisms of disassociation. Here, the Western world is portrayed as an "enemy" of the Islamic world. The aim is to bring about the victory of Islam over the "morally inferior West". Religious rules are considered "divine law" and are not debatable.
The religious establishment and the parts of the Islamist movement that distance themselves from violence have over the past few years increased their legal presence in most states, or have been able to consolidate the fact that they are tolerated.
The Iraq War in 2003 gave them further impetus and, as a result, the image of a world divided into two camps continues to flourish. The way they present the threat to their (religious-cultural) identity from external powers and the demand for the mobilisation of defence forces is falling on fertile ground - even among the intelligentsia that are not of an Islamist persuasion.
Liberals on the defence
In this way, since the 11 September 2001 and the 2003 Iraq War, US foreign policy has provided arguments for the re-Islamicisation of the debates about cultural identity and political reform. There is unanimity about the rejection of an enforced Western-style democratisation.
The purport of the debate is that the only way to prevent foreign interference, cultural dominance, and egalitarianism (in the context of globalisation processes) is to reinforce the religious-cultural - and above all Islamic - identity.
This is why those who speak out in favour of Western-style liberalisation and democratisation always end up on the defence - if not completely out of the picture - in all debates. The Berber-speakers’ movement in Algeria and Morocco - which is also currently holding a heated debate about the reform of identity and politics - has, however, remained unaffected by this development. Their professed goal is still the secularisation and democratisation of states.
Islamicisation as a response to US policy and globalisation
The "re-strengthening" of nationalist Islamic or Islamist alliances and discourses is a reaction to what are perceived as, or anticipated to be the negative consequences of globalisation and the behaviour of the US administration since 11 September 2001.
The more moralising and missionary the US administration became, the more the globalisation debate in North Africa and the Near and Middle East was dominated by religious, moral, anti-imperialistic, and anti-American arguments.
These arguments and the fact that they shared a joint enemy (the USA), led to a rapprochement between religious conservatives and Islamists on the one hand, and former left-wingers, Arab nationalists, and liberals on the other.
This is why the globalisation debate focuses mainly on cultural globalisation, its effects, and the "strategy of US imperialism". The debate on imperialism and nationalism, which has been revived since the second Gulf War in 1990/1, also promotes the development of a "national protective wall" against heteronomy and the loss of identity, and has at least raised the issue of Arab nationalism once again.
The exploitation of political Islam
In January 2001, President Mubarak proposed the "revival" of nationalism in Egypt as a means of protection against cultural globalisation. This official proposal, which was couched in moral discourse, adopted Islamist positions and demands.
Here too, the common goal is "rejection": resistance to outside influences, the loss of identity, egalitarianism, and dominance by third parties. "Western" concepts are declared to be incompatible with the cultural values, identity, and cultural particularism of the region.
The "rejection of external influences", the "preservation of authenticity", and the "respect for particularity" are the key phrases that are determining the direction in which these debates are moving. Equating (cultural) globalisation with "westernisation" and "Americanisation" is very pronounced.
Religious-cultural arguments, and Islamist, nationalist, and Arab nationalist positions are popular at the moment in the debate about identity, the debate about political reform and democratisation, and the debate about anti-globalisation, anti-Americanism, and anti-imperialism. However, the debate about human rights and, above all, equal rights for women has receded into the background in most states.
Islamists as spokesmen for social debates
The influence of religious organisations and representatives as well as Islamist organisations and groups is well rooted in the most varied social classes and is very pronounced. In other words, religious conservatives and Islamists are incredibly influential people in these debates.
Tunisia and Libya, where Islamist groups were heavily opposed and no longer have any room to manoeuvre, are an exception to this rule. So-called liberals of a secular orientation, who support the idea of a democratisation of the political system and a Western-style modernisation of society, are a minority group in all states.
They simply do not have support in society. Moreover, this minority of secular liberals does not always actively promote democratisation and is not always an outspoken, uncompromising critic and opponent of the government; in fact, some liberals are even part of the state and administrative apparatus.
Just as the concepts that were imported after 1967 met with increasing opposition; the American declaration to export "democratic governance" to North Africa and the Near and Middle East since the 2003 Iraq War in particular, has led to an increase in the number of voices opposing imported concepts and external interference in political and social debates.
Reinforcing religious-cultural identity
The tone of these debates is dictated by religious conservatives and the Islamist movement. The identity debate, which they dominate, has become a key debate over the past three years as a result of the external threat. This is particularly true in Egypt and the states of the Near and Middle East.
Since 11 September 2001, Islamist organisations and groups have shown themselves to be very flexible despite increased control and monitoring in several states. They know how to adapt their ideas to suit the circumstances and to use arguments drawn from the prevailing political climate to strengthen their influence in society.
In this way, they have succeeded in many social circles in inciting a latent fear of religious-cultural exploitation and the loss of identity.
For large parts of the population in North Africa and the Near and Middle East, this fear - which covers "the protection of Islam" or the preservation of religious influence, the status of religion in state and society, and the identity of the people in the region - is at the heart of their judgment of the "West’s" policy towards the Arab and Islamic world.
The USA’s policy in the Middle East and the US government’s declared intention to completely restructure the region (by exporting democracy) is playing into the hands of the Islamists by inciting even more fear and allowing Islamists to portray themselves as the defenders of national sovereignty and religious-cultural identity.
The decline of political Islam is not in sight
Furthermore, the Islamists are considered plausible because they don’t - as numerous governments in the region do - co-operate with the USA. The results of the study make it clear that an end to the fundamentalist and Islamist movement in the majority of the states in North Africa and the Near and Middle East is not to be expected in the medium term.
On the contrary; new opportunities for Islamicising societies according to its ideals are opening up for the Islamist movement. The USA’s policy, which has been perceived as an external threat since 11 September 2001, has also pushed into the background any differences between Islamists and fundamentalists on the one hand and secular nationalists and former left-wingers on the other, in favour of a joint position from which the "common enemy" can be fought.
Sigrid Faath
© Sigrid Faath/German Institute for Middle East Studies (Deutsches Orient-Institut), Hamburg 2004
Translation from German: Aingeal Flanagan
The complete study can be obtained either from the German Institute for Middle East Studies or in German bookshops. (Available in German only)
Sigrid Faath (publisher): "Politische und gesellschaftliche Debatten in Nordafrika, Nah- und Mittelost. Inhalte, Träger, Perspektiven." (Political and social debates in North Africa, the Near and Middle East. Contents, Players, Prospects.) Hamburg 2004, 508 pages, ISBN 3-89173-086-1