Parliamentary elections in Lebanon

Much ado about nothing

Lebanonʹs forthcoming parliamentary elections will likely be the dullest since the end of the countryʹs war in 1990. No significant surprises appear to be looming, nor are there major political stakes or programmes mobilising the attention of voters. By Joseph Bahout

With Lebanonʹs parliamentary elections scheduled for 6 May, it has been almost a decade since the last elections were held in 2009, during which time the country has gone through major transformations. During this time, the rift that existed between Lebanonʹs two contending political coalitions – the March 8 and March 14 alignments – has withered away. However, the promise of more effective governance remains to be fulfilled as the Lebanese have struggled with major domestic problems, such as continuing electricity shortages, a major rubbish crisis, not to mention an increasingly alarming economic situation.

The elections themselves will be based on a strange form of proportional representation, which will alter the historical pattern of electoral behaviour. That is why, in theory at least, the elections should have represented an exciting moment of renewal for political life and the countryʹs elites, while creating an opportunity for addressing the countryʹs challenges. They could also have been used to examine how the new law has affected the degrees of continuity and change in the Lebanese political landscape.

Instead, all the indications are that Lebanon is heading toward one of the dullest elections since the end of the war in 1990. No significant surprises appear to be looming, nor are there major political stakes or programmes mobilising the attention of voters. The political divisions of the past have given way to a sometimes surreal web of opportunistic alliances, while in the pre-election phase newer alternative political forces from Lebanonʹs civil society appear to have failed to live up to expectations based on their previous performance.

Gerrymandered as standard

The electoral law divides Lebanon into fifteen constituencies, uneven in size, number of seats and number of voters. Some of these constituencies combine several of Lebanonʹs smaller administrative districts (qadaʹ), some are formed by a single qadaʹ, and some are made up of a single governorate (muhafaza), or large administrative district. Such gerrymandering is an outcome of the narrow electoral interests of those who devised the law.

Taking a step back from the intricacies of the law, one can derive some general conclusions. Except for the Shia alliance of Hezbollah and the Amal Movement, Lebanonʹs other major political forces have failed to form joint electoral lists on the national level.

Some are allied in a number of constituencies and competing in others. In several constituencies, political forces that are almost identical in their nature and alignments will be pitted against each other solely because of personal rivalries. All this, which has confused voters, is to the detriment of any coherent political manifesto.

What are some of the things to watch for on election day, which could tell us something about the state of Lebanese politics in general?

One is undoubtedly related to Prime Minister Saad Hariri. This is especially relevant after the episode last November when Hariri was forced to resign while in Saudi Arabia, before backtracking on his resignation. Subsequently, the prime minister was again embraced by the Saudis, even if this did not imply that he would prioritise political alliances with those parties that had been part of the March 14 alignment, something the Saudis favoured.

Aoun: Haririʹs insurance policy

Rather, Haririʹs decision to ally himself in the elections with the Free Patriotic Movement of President Michel Aoun and his son-in-law Gebran Bassil has proven resilient, and has been legitimised by Hariri as a way of drawing Aoun and Bassil away from their alliance with Hezbollah.

In part, Hariri sees his relationship with Aoun as a way of ensuring that he will return as prime minister after the elections. Haririʹs resignation in Saudi Arabia and its aftermath ended an inter-Christian rapprochement between Aoun and the second major Christian political party, the Lebanese Forces. The reason is that the Lebanese Forces came out of the affair looking as if they opposed the strengthened political ties between Hariri and Aoun, which had helped bring both men to power.

Saad Hariri, who announced his resignation as Lebanon's prime minister from Saudi Arabia reacts as he talks with Lebanese President Michel Aoun while attending a military parade to celebrate the 74th anniversary of Lebanon's independence in downtown Beirut, Lebanon 22 November 2017 (photo: Reuters/Mohamed Azakir)
A debt of gratitude: Saad Hariri's surprise announcement of an intent to resign, broadcast on 4 November 2017 on Saudi state TV, was widely regarded as part of the Iran-Saudi Arabia proxy conflict in Lebanon, and triggered a dispute between Lebanon and Saudi Arabia. The resignation was later suspended, following President Michel Aoun's request to "put it on hold ahead of further consultations"

The relationship between the Christian parties will have longer-term repercussions in the run-up to the next presidential election in five years. Thatʹs because both are vying for the role of principal representative of Lebanonʹs Christians.

With regard to Christian leadership, one race in particular will have a bearing on what happens in the future. It could even be viewed as a primary for the presidential election. In the northern district of Bsharri-Zghorta-Koura-Batroun, three major Maronite Christian pretenders to the presidency will have a stake in the outcome, even if they are not necessarily candidates themselves: Bassil, the Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea, and the Marada Party leader Suleiman Franjieh. How each of these politicians fares will determine their appeal and legitimacy to possibly present themselves as successors to Aoun.

Shia community drained

Overall, the March 8 alignment has proven much more adept than March 14 at averting fragmentation. However, that does not mean that there are no potential problems. Particularly significant will be what happens to the main Shia parties, Hezbollah and Amal. Many indicators suggest that the two have lost traction within their constituencies.

This could be a result of Hezbollahʹs participation in the Syrian conflict, which has drained the Shia community. It could be that the Shia, like all other Lebanese communities, are suffering from the shortcomings of their political representatives. Or it could be that the new election law has opened cracks through which rivals of the two parties within the Shia community could potentially enter political life.

In the two Shia-majority areas of southern Lebanon and the northern Beqaa Valley, relatively well-organised alternative political forces have risen to challenge Hezbollah and Amal, even if their ability to undermine the power of the parties is likely to remain limited. In their relations with other allies, Hezbollah and Amal have also had to contend with the growing willingness of those forces to affirm themselves politically. For instance, Hezbollah has shown irritation with Bassil, the Aounistsʹ chief election strategist, who has sought to dictate terms to his closest allies in the formation of joint candidate lists.

The role of Hezbollah

This leads to a question that many people are asking today, both domestically and abroad: will Hezbollah remain the dominant force in Lebanon after the election? And what can we expect from the aftermath?

The likelihood is that Hezbollah will continue to retain a dominant national role, thanks to the probable fragmentation of the political landscape, a process that the law on proportional representation will only exacerbate.
Lebanon's Hezbollah leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah is seen on a video screen as he addresses his supporters in Beirut, 10 November 2017 (photo: Reuters/Aziz Taher)
A loss of traction: Hezbollahʹs participation in the Syrian conflict has drained the Shia community. The Shia, like all other Lebanese communities, are suffering from the shortcomings of their political representatives. Thanks to the new election law, however, there is a chance that rivals of Hezbollah and Amal within the Shia community could potentially enter political life through the cracks of proportional representation

Because of the erosion of March 14, rising competition within other sects (with new Sunni figures challenging Saad Hariri, Christian competition over who will succeed Aoun, and the fact that Druze leader Walid Joumblatt is having to share the Druze scene with rivals), and a Shia speaker of parliament, Nabih Berri, who is older and feebler, therefore will have less latitude to manoeuver with regard to Hezbollah, it appears that the party will retain its strength in the years ahead.

Moreover, divisive issues such as Hezbollahʹs weapons and the controversy over its participation in regional conflicts are almost entirely absent from the electoral campaigns, indicating implicit acceptance of the partyʹs domestic hegemony.

Failure of civil society

If there had seemed to be one bright spot in the elections it was the promise of civil society. After the prominent role played by civil society groups in the garbage crisis of 2015, as well as in the municipal elections of 2016, optimism seemed possible. However, this was not to be.

Falling into the long-established traps of Lebanese politics, civil society groups ended up losing some strong figures to traditional political forces, sometimes even choosing to ally themselves with members of the same political class they pretend to be contesting.

For the silent majority, this will probably leave a bitter taste. It will also heighten voter apathy and a feeling of estrangement towards a political system that, through its ability to co-opt, bribe and sideline meaningful debate, has shown a remarkable capacity to survive.

Joseph Bahout

© Carnegie Middle East Center 2018

Joseph Bahout is a visiting scholar in Carnegie’s Middle East Program. His research focusses on political developments in Lebanon and Syria, regional spillover from the Syrian crisis and identity politics across the region.

More on this topic